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RECENT DECISIONS

SECURITY TRANSACTIONS - NOTICE FILING - UNIFORM COMCODE DOES NOT REQUIRE FINANCING STATEMENT TO
INCLUDE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE. - Plaintiff entered
MERCIAL

into a conditional sales contract with a vendee for the sale of a
cash register, which was to be delivered at a future date. Subsequently, the defendant made a loan to the plaintiff's vendee.
Under the terms of this security agreement the collateral for the
loan was to include all after-acquired property. Thereafter, the
defendant filed a financing statement which failed to refer to the
after-acquired property clause. Subsequent to this loan, the plaintiff delivered the cash register, and filed his financing statement
one month later. Upon the vendee's default with both parties,
the defendant took possession of the cash register and sold it.
In an action for conversion by the conditional vendor, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in reversing both the trial court
and the appellate division, found for the defendant, and held that
the financing statement was sufficient notice of defendant's interest
in any after-acquired property. National Cash Register Co. v.
, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
Mass.
Firestone & Co.,
The instant case was concerned with three basic policies of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: the provision for2
notice filing; 1 the enforceability of 3after-acquired property clauses;
and the priorities among creditors.
In order to understand these policies fully, it is necessary
to examine the difficulties of operating under pre-Code security
law.
Under pre-Code law there were many types of security
arrangements such as chattel mortgages, conditional sales contracts,
trust receipts, factor's liens, and assignments of accounts receivable.
The manner of perfecting these interests was determined by the
type of security arrangement that was used. 4
The Code, in order to simplify this complexity, devised a
method of perfection which would apply to all security transactions.5
Distinctions based on the form of the agreement are eliminated 6
and the Code provides that perfection shall be determined by
1 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302, 9-401, 9-407 (hereinafter
cited as UCC).
2 See UCC § 9-204.
3 See UCC §§ 9-301, 9-318.
4 See Coogan, Public Notice Under The Uniform Commercial Code And
Other Recent Chattel Security Laws Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA
L. REv. 289, 291 n.4 (1962).
5 UCC § 9-102, comment.
6 See UCC § 1-201 (37) which defines a "security interest" as "an
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
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the type of collateral in which the security interest inheres.7
In order to create a security interest under the Code, the parties
must enter into a "security agreement;" 8 the secured party must
give value at some time; and the debtor must acquire rights in
the collateral.9 When these three steps have been taken, the
security interest is said to have "attached." 10
The fact that the security interest has "attached" to the
collateral does not make the security agreement enforceable against
a debtor, or against any subsequent creditors. To make the
agreement enforceable against a debtor, it is necessary to have
him sign the agreement or have the secured party take possession
of the collateral. 1 In order to make the agreement enforceable
against subsequent creditors one further step is necessary. A
"financing statement" must be filed, or the secured party must
take possession of the collateral. 12 When this is done the security
interest is said to be "perfected." 13 Upon perfection, the secured
party will generally be permitted to recover the collateral even
against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.' 4
The first of the three policies discussed in the principal case
was notice filing. Under pre-Code law, evidence of the security
interest generally had to be filed to be enforceable against subsequent creditors. 15 The evidence required was the agreement itself
in most cases, and it usually had to be accompanied by some
supplementary document, such as an affidavit or an acknowledgment. 16 These requirements had to be followed precisely and
any deviation, however slight, rendered the agreement unenforceable against subsequent creditors.
Columbus Merchandise Co. v. Kline 17 is perhaps the classic
example of the exactness required. The applicable Ohio statute
7 SPIVACK,

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

UNDER

THE

UNIFOLM

COMMERCIAL

CODE 77 (1962).
8 UCC §9-105 (1)(h) defines a "security agreement" as "an agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest."
9UCC § 9-204 (1).
10 UCC § 9-204 (1).
"UCC §9-203 (1).
12UCC §§ 9-302, 9-304.
13 UCC § 9-303. The sequence of these necessary steps may be varied
in any manner by the parties. The time of "perfection" then occurs when
all 3A
theUCC
required
steps have
taken.
§§ 9-301(l),
(2),been
9-310.
'3 Coogan, Public Notice Under The Uniform Commercial Code And
Other Recent Chattel Security Laws Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L.
REv. 289, 311 (1962).
16 Coogan, supra note 15, at 311, 313.
17248 Fed. 296 (S.D. Ohio 1917). See General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952) (the failure of
exactness was that "E. R. Miller Company" was used instead of "E. R.
Miller Co., Inc." as designation of the trustee).

1963 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

stated that a conditional sales contract would not be enforceable
unless its conditions were evidenced by a writing signed by the
purchaser, and unless a "statement thereon under oath" made by
the seller as to the claim of title was included. Because the
affidavit was stapled to the conditional sales contract, the court
held that this did not meet the statutory requirement of "thereon."
Therefore, the conditional seller was reduced to the status of a
general creditor.
It was evident that the courts had come to view filing as a
ritual which was to be rigidly adhered to, and had lost sight of the
true purpose of filing, which was notice.' 8 This attitude of the
courts has been called "fanatical and impossibly refined." 19
Because of this, the Code adopts for all security transactions
the system of filing adopted under the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act.20 It is no longer necessary to file the agreement itself, and
the statutory requirements are minimal. What is to be filed
is a "financing statement" or a copy of the security agreement.
The financing statement is adequate if it is signed by both parties,
gives the address of the debtor and secured party, and contains
a description of the types or items of collateral. 21 It need not
be specific, and it is sufficient if it reasonably identifies what is
described. Minor errors are to be disregarded provided that they
are not "seriously misleading." 22
The second policy discussed by the Court in the instant case
was the enforceability of after-acquired property clauses. Until
1843, property to be created or acquired in the future could not
be transferred or encumbered prior to the creation or acquisition
of the property. 23 Since then, New York has recognized, with
respect to subsequent purchasers, a recorded mortgage of afteracquired property as fully effective.2 4 However, its effectiveness
is limited by courts, which hold that a mortgagee benefiting from
an after-acquired property clause has a subordinate claim to
creditors acquiring an interest in the property before the mortgagee
takes possession.25 This result is justified on the ground that
This same
the recording is not constructive notice to creditors.2
rationale applies to subsequent purchasers. For example, in
Is Coogan, supra note 15, at 319.
19 UCC § 9-402, comment.
20 Coogan, supra note 15, at 290; see N.Y. PzRs. PRop. LAw § 59(e).
21 UCC § 9-402(1).
22 UCC § 9-402(5).
(C.C.D. Me.
23 Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 Fed. Cas. 527 (No. 9673)
1843).
24 Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 811 (1890) ; See also Titusville
Iron Co. v. New York, 207 N.Y. 203, 209, 100 N.E. 806, 808 (1912).
25Titusville Iron Co. v. New York, supra note 24; Zartman v. First Nat'l
Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
26 Ibid.
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Rochester Distillinig Co. v. Rasey 2 7 the judgment debtor had
mortgaged his future crops to the defendant's vendor. Prior to
the commencement of foreclosure proceedings under this mortgage,
the sheriff levied execution on the crops for the benefit of the
judgment creditor. The court, in finding for the plaintiff, held
that a chattel mortgage containing an after-acquired property
clause was void against a subsequent purchaser at an executjon
sale.
These after-acquired property clauses are enforceable only in
equity, where they are viewed as covenants to give a lien,28 and
will be enforced
only when the rights of other creditors will not
29
be prejudiced.

In contrast to the present laws, the Code validates the
effectiveness of after-acquired property clauses on a broad plain.3 0
Article 9 makes possible the perfection of security interests in
after-acquired property in almost all classes of security, 81 without
any further act at the time 8 the
property comes into existence or
2
into the debtor's possession.
The third policy of article 9 discussed in the main case is
priorities among creditors. According to New York's present law,
a conditional sales interest has priority over the interest of a prior
mortgagee under an after-acquired property clause, whether or
not the contract is filed. 33

This preference, which pre-Code law

gave to a "purchase money security interest," 34 was usually
justified because title remained in the conditional vendor.35
27142
N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894).
2
sGuaranty Trust Co. v. New York & Queens County Ry., 253 N.Y. 190,
199,29170 N.E. 887, 890 (1930).
Zartman v. First Natl Bank, supra note 25, at 271, 82 N.E. at
128.
30 UCC § 9-204(3) ; see UCC § 9-204, comment.
31 UCC § 9-204(3), (4) ; see Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code Without Help or Hindrance of the "Floating
Lien," 15 Bus. LAw. 373 (1959-60) for a full discussion of the policy
considerations.
32 See UCC § 9-204, comment. Under pre-Code law it was necessary to

refile each time new collateral came into existence or into the mortgagor's

possession. Coogan, Public Notice Under The Uniform Commercial Code
And Other Recent Chattel Security Laws Including "Notice Filing," 47
IowA L. REv. 284, 302 (1962).
33 New York & Suburban Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crescent Const'n
Corp., 196 Misc. 532, 92 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1949). However, if the
mortgage is subsequent to a conditional sales contract which has not been
filed, the mortgagee prevails. Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
259 N.Y. 343, 182 N.E. 10 (1932).
34 UCC § 9-107.
35 Perfect Lighting Fixtures Co. v. Grubar Realty Corp., 228 App. Div.
141, 239 N.Y. Supp. 286 (lst Dep't 1930).
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Although the Code rules apply regardless of ownership, 36 it
recognizes this preference for a purchase money security interest
and gives it a priority over a prior conflicting interest in the
same collateral, upon the condition that the interest be perfected
when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within
ten days thereafter.37
In cases where the purchase money
security interest does not qualify for this special priority, the
relative priorities will be governed by three rules: (1) first to
file if both are perfected by filing; (2) first to perfect unless
both are perfected
by filing; and (3) first to attach unless either
38
is perfected.
In the instant decision the Court was presented with a case
of first impression under the Code. The plaintiff's main contention
was that the defendant's financing statement should have contained
an after-acquired
property clause in order for the security interest
39
to attach.
As a preliminary to reaching the main issue the Court reasoned
that the intent of the parties is to be judged by the language of the
security agreement and that the security agreement was sufficiently
broad to cover the cash register. 40 The security agreement referred to "all contents of luncheonette" and to "all property and
articles now, and which may hereafter be, used . . . with, (or)
added . . . to . . . any of the foregoing described property." 4'

The Court held that this description complied with the standard of
"reasonable identification" of the collateral as expressed in the
42
Code.
In deciding for the defendant, the Court held that the financing
statement was sufficient notice to plaintiff. In view of the broad
purposes of the Code, the Court held that it could best carry out
the intention of the framers by not giving a restrictive interpretation to the section which established
notice filing and the use of a
43
more flexible financing statement.
Because the Code gives only the debtor the right to demand
further information from the secured party, the plaintiff contended
that this procedure would not aid prospective creditors if the
36 UCC § 9-202 provides that "each provision of this Article with regard
to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or in the debtor."
37 UCC § 9-312(4).
38 UCC § 9-312(5).

39 National

Cash Register

Co. v. Firestone & Co., -,

Mass.

,

,

191 40N.E.2d 471, 474 (1963).
Id. at -, 191 N.E.2d at 473.
41 Ibid.
42

Ibid. The provision for reasonable identification is found in Section
9-110 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
43 National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., supra note 39, at -,
191 N.E2d at 474.
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debtor or named creditor is slow in giving, or refuses to give
the necessary information. 44 The Court stated that the procedure
was authorized by the Code and if the plaintiff's contention was
true the remedy was with the legislature and not the courts.
By broadly construing the filing requirements as to description
of the collateral, the Court, in effect, made a policy determination
which, if followed, will minimize the "notice" value of a filing to
an interested party. The purpose of notice filing under the Code
is two-fold: to protect a security interest, and to give potential
creditors a means of ascertaining information.45 Thus the statute
requires a description which will indicate either the types or items
of collateral. 46 As a result of this case, it would seem that the
financing statement in Massachusetts need only contain the name
and address of the debtor and secured party and some indication
that the secured party has an interest in some or all of the
debtor's property. Furthermore, the Court implies that afteracquired property is not a separate and distinct "type" of property,
and that "all equipment" is sufficiently broad to cover it.
These results will necessitate regular usage of the imperfect
discovery procedure set forth in the Code.47 Under this procedure
the inquiring party is unable to force the disclosure of the information. Because of this, the practitioner should not exploit the
leniency of the Code by supplying as little information as possible.
Otherwise priority problems and unnecessary litigation would
arise,
48
tending to defeat the purpose of the Code's filing system.
The criticisms already set forth may lead New York courts
to find that a failure to refer to after-acquired property in
the financing statement is misleading. Coupled with the inadequacies in the Code's discovery procedure and the importance
of giving proper notice is a strong policy favoring the purchase
money creditor. Thus, the result in New York may well be
different from that arrived at by the Massachusetts Court.49

44
d. at -, 191 N.E.2d at 474 n.5; see Coogan, Public Notice Under
The Uniform Commercial Code And Other Recent Chattel Security Laws
Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. Rzv. 289, 344 (1962). Upon failure
to comply with this request within two weeks, the secured party runs the
risk of losing his security interest. UCC § 9-208.
45

UCC § 9-402, comment.

46 UCC §9-402(1).
47
UCC § 9-208. See Coogan, supra note 44.
48 See Coogan, supra note 44, at 344 for a discussion of the problems
and a comparison of Section 9-208 and other notice filing statutes.
49 In the principal case the Massachusetts Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws submitted a brief as amicus curiae sustaining the defendant's

contentions. Notwithstanding the weight of this authority, unless the courts
do not follow this case notice filing will give little, if any "notice."

